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  Predicting the outcome of sporting events certainly falls within the purview of the field of 
forecasting.  Moreover, the large amount of data regarding the outcomes of sporting events 
makes it possible to undertake significant research about the forecasts of those events.  Yet 
despite the 40,000 entries in JSTOR and 3700 in Econ Lit that refer to sports, there are few 
papers that have focused exclusively on the characteristics of sports forecasts.  Rather, the data 
associated with sporting events have been used to examine a number of topics and test a number 
of hypotheses that are related to forecasting or to economic and financial behavior under 
uncertainty.  These include the economic efficiency of betting markets and the use of 
information in responding to betting odds.
1   
  Economic studies concerned with the efficiency of the betting market have sought to 
determine whether there were any betting strategies that could “beat the market”, i.e be 
 
1Sports data have also been used to investigate topics such as: the strategies (minmax, 
risk taking) that competitive players and teams employ, the benefits of stadia and teams to cities, 
the business and management of professional team sports including the trading of players, the 
market structure and competitiveness of professional leagues with free agency and payroll caps, 
labor relations and the effects of strikes, the determinants of attendance at sporting events, and 
even the problems associated with adverse selection in the sale of thoroughbred race horses.  
Research Program on Forecasting (RPF) Working Papers represent preliminary work circulated for comment and 
discussion.  Please contact the author(s) before citing this paper in any publications.  The views expressed in RPF 
Working Papers are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of RPF or George 
Washington University.   
                                                                                                                                                            
profitable. ( See Sauer (1998) and Vaughan Williams (1999) for surveys of the efficient market 
literature).  These betting markets are similar to financial markets, so it is possible to test 
behavioral hypotheses applicable to the financial markets and to the field of forecasting.  If there 




                                                
to determine the biases that produced those inefficiencies.
2  Even in the absence of 
inefficiencies, the betting data available from these markets would permit one to extract 
information about the betting market process and the way it attains efficiency. (Sauer, 2005).  
  Since, the majority of previous betting markets studies were concerned with economic 
efficiency, they did not evaluate the actual (or implied) forecasts associated with those markets.  
As it turns out, it is possible to derive considerable information about the forecasts and the 
forecasting process from the studies that tested the markets for economic efficiency.  
  Since the betting markets provide a huge number of observations, it is possible to obtain 
robust tests of various hypotheses concerning forecasting.  It is not necessary to base findings on 
laboratory experiments with a small number of observations that may not replicate the conditions 
of the real world.  For example, one study that compared the predictive accuracy of judgmental 
forecasters with statistical systems was based on 31,000 observations of real time predictions of 
the outcomes of American football games.   
  This paper is concerned with a number of forecasting topics.   The first topic involves the 
type of forecast that is made.  In some sports the forecast is intended to determine the winner of 
an event.  In other betting markets, individuals predict whether/or not the favored team wins by x 
points (called the point spread).  A second topic involves the procedures that are used to evaluate 
the forecasts. This paper will show that the evaluation procedures depend on the type of betting 
market that is associated with each sport.  A third topic involves a comparison of alternative 
forecasting methods.  For every sport, forecasts have been made by models (systems) and 
 
2Moreover, since a sporting event has a definite outcome at a specific point in time, it is 
not necessary to make assumptions about expectations of the future as is necessary in other asset 
markets.   
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experts.  In some sports, it is also possible to analyze a forecast that is made by the market. The 
final topic is to determine whether the forecasts are biased and, if they exist, the sources of the 
biases.   
  These topics will be discussed on a sport-by-sport basis in the next few sections.  Then 
we will undertake a cross sport comparison to determine whether the results for individual sports 
yield valid generalizations about sports forecasting.  Finally, we compare the findings from 
sports forecasts with the profession’s generally accepted beliefs and see whether they are 
consistent. 
 
    I. The Sports Gambling Market and Forecast Evaluation Procedures 
  Given that the data are generally associated with and obtained from the gambling market, 
it is first necessary to discuss how the markets are structured.  The gambling markets are 
constituted differently from sport to sport.  In horse racing, baseball and soccer the bet involves 
picking a winner, and the market quotes odds that a particular horse or team will win.   As an 
example, if there were only two teams and there were no commissions, the odds on the underdog 
might be 2 to1 and the odds on the favored would then be 1 to 2.  A winning bet on the underdog 
will pay $2 for every $1 that was bet and the payoff to the favorite would be 50 cents for every 
dollar bet.  In either case, the winner would also have the original bet returned; in our example 
the payoffs would be $3 and $1.50, respectively for every dollar bet. 
  In markets where odds are quoted,  it is not possible to determine whether forecasters 
correctly predicted the winners when there are more than two competitors.   Rather the 
forecasting evaluation is based on a comparison of the ex ante probabilities and the ex post ratio  
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of outcomes.  The betting odds must, therefore, be converted into probabilities by the formula,    
p = 1/(1+odds).
3      For each ex ante probability, pi , the ex post proportion of winning horses, 
that went off at those odds, should be equal to pi.  Using statistical terminology, the ex ante 
probabilities and the ex post winning percentage should be calibrated, i.e. horses whose ex ante 
probability of winning was 0.30 should have won 30 percent of the time. 
  The evaluation procedure is different in those markets where bets are placed on the 
margin of victory.  In American football and in basketball, bets are not made on which team will 
win nor are odds quoted in the market.  Rather there is a bet on whether or not the favored team 
will win by more than the specified margin (point spread) that is set in the market.
4  Given the 
data from the betting markets of those two sports,  it is possible to evaluate the accuracy of two 
types of forecasts: The accuracy of the forecasts in (a) selecting the winning team and (b) in 
predicting whether the favored team beat the spread? 
  The procedures for evaluating forecasts will differ from sport to sport depending upon 
the institutional structure of the betting market that is associated with that sport.  
 
    II. Types of forecasts 
  The forecasts that we examine come from three sources.  First, there is the market 
forecast itself.  Experts, be they bookmakers, handicappers or sports commentators, also issue 
forecasts about the likely outcomes of sporting events.  Finally, forecasts can be derived from 
 
3If the sum of the betting odds exceeds one because of the bookmakers’ commissions or 
the parimutuel take, they must be adjusted so that they sum to one.  
4Although odds are not quoted, the bet is not even money because the bettor must commit 
$11 to win 10.  Since bookmakers set the point spread in an attempt to receive an equal amount  
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statistical models that are based on the fundamentals of the sports or are based on variables that 
are proxies for these characteristics.   
  A. Market forecasts 
   For each sport, the largest number of forecasts come from the betting market.  The 
market forecast is either the final odds that a team will win or the final point spread.  As 
indicated above, these forecasts can be analyzed in several different ways, depending on whether 
odds or point spreads are quoted. Nevertheless, it is always possible to test for the existence of 
biases and to determine whether the market forecasts were more accurate than those of other 
forecasting methods. 
 B.  Models
5
  In order to predict the outcome of sporting events, different types of models can be 
constructed.  At the most disaggregated level,  it is possible to predict the outcome of a game by 
modeling the effects of every play. (For baseball see Bukiet et al.,1997 and Sauer, 2005; for 
soccer see Carmichael et al., 2000).  At a more aggregative level, production functions are used. 
These functions focus on the fundamental factors that determine the outcome of a game. On 
offense it is the factors that determine the number of points or runs scored; on defense the factors 
that determine the  number of points or runs allowed.   The model that is used to forecast the 
outcome of a game is then based on the differences in the fundamental characteristics of the two 
teams.   
  An alternative statistical procedure is to construct a power score or index that is a proxy 
                                                                                                                                                             
of money on both sides of the bet, the deviation from the even money bet represents the 
bookmakers’ commission.  
  8
                                                                                                                                                            
for these fundamental characteristics or the latent skills and strengths of the teams.  Such a model 
merely uses the difference in runs ( points, goals) scored as a predictor.  Then there are models 
that use power scores based on relative performance as the independent variables.   The focus of 
these models is exclusively on the relative number (and margins) of victories of the competing 
teams and the time trend in this relationship.  For example, the New York Times created power 
scores for every NFL team that summarized each team’s relative performance in previous games.  
It was based on the winning percentage of each team, its margin of victory, and the quality of its 
opponents. Similar measures, that include the strength of schedule, have been constructed for 
other sports. These power scores can be transformed further into ordinal rankings.  ( Boulier and 
Stekler, 2003). 
 C.  Experts 
  Finally, we have predictions made by individuals (experts) who may or may not reveal 
their methods.  Some of these experts are sports writers, editors of newspapers or sports 
magazines, or sports commentators on the major television networks; others are tipsters .  The 
odds makers in the betting markets and the track handicappers should also be considered experts. 
  
  III.  What has been forecast? 
  The literature with which we are concerned has examined economic efficiency issues in 
virtually every sport, but the emphasis has been on the outcomes of horse races and of baseball, 
football, basketball, and soccer games.  There are also forecasts about the winners of 
tournaments such as the NCAA basketball championships and the winners of the championship 
 
5It should be noted that many of the models that have been estimated and that are  
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of particular leagues.  We present the methodologies and results for each sport separately and 
then provide a cross-sport summary in order to generalize the findings.     
  A. Horse Racing 
   Sauer (1998) and Vaughan Williams (1999) have surveyed the major studies that 
analyzed the outcomes of horse races.  While the major emphasis of these studies was on the 
economic efficiency of the betting markets, these analyses provided insights that can have 
general applicability to all fields of forecasting.  The observed inefficiencies provide information 
about the biases that exist.  Moreover, the results suggest that it is even possible to model the 
outcome of horse races.  These statistical models take into account the quality of the competition 
that occurs during a race. 
  1. Betting Market 
  The results indicate that the market can distinguish among horses of different quality.  
With a particular exception, the subjective probabilities obtained from the odds rank of the 
horses are well calibrated with the observed frequency of wins. (Sauer, 1998, pp. 2035 and 
2044).  This indicates the obvious presence of individuals who are informed forecasters and can 
predict the outcomes of horse races.   
  The exception to the aforementioned calibration occurs at the extremes of the odds 
distribution.  Most studies of horse racing in the US yield a result that has been called “ the 
favorite- long shot bias”.  This means that in the parimutuel market, an insufficient amount is bet 
upon the horses that are favored to win and an excessive amount is bet on the long shots, thus 
 
discussed in this paper have never been used in forecasting beyond the period of fit.  
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distorting the odds at the extremes.
6
  This bias can be explained either by individuals’ underestimates (overestimates) of 
favorites (long shots) or by  bettors’ utility functions that are locally risk seeking. (Quandt, 
1986). Golec and Tamarkin (1995) favored the hypothesis that bettors were overconfident in 
their abilities to predict rather than being risk seekers.  This result is consistent with the findings 
from some laboratory experiments indicating that individuals generally underestimate the 
probability of likely events and overestimate the probability that an unlikely event will occur.
7  
  The bias may also occur because the quality of information that is available to bettors is 
poor. (Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1998).  When more information  is available publicly and 
the bettors are better informed, the more likely it is that the consensus forecast ( represented by 
the market odds) will converge to the true odds.  Empirical evidence is consistent with this view, 
because the bias is diminished if either the betting pool or the number of horses in the race is 
increased. (Busche and Hall, 1988; Gramm and Owens, 2005). 
  2. Modeling  
  Bolton and Chapman (1986) construct a multinomial logit model of horse racing that 
includes characteristics of both the horse and the jockey.
8  While the final equation includes 
many variables that are not statistically significant, one characteristic, the speed of the horse 
contributes the most to explaining the variance of the horse races.  The adjusted R
2 of the 
 
6This bias does not exist in race horse betting in Hong Kong and Japan, for example. It 
also does not exist in most other sports. 
7In fact, Vaughan Williams (1999, p.8) cites one study that finds that bettors are 
overconfident. 
8The characteristics of the horse include the percentage of races won, winnings per race, 
an index measuring speed, weight and post position.  The jockey characteristics include the 
number of races won and his winning percentage.  
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equation is .09 indicating that the equation explains 9% more than the null that each horse has an 
equal chance of winning. 
  Expanded versions of this multinomial logit model improve the explanatory power of the 
equations, with most of the new variables significant and the adjusted R
2 exceeding 12%. 
(Bentner, 1994;Chapman, 1994).  While the final betting odds have even more explanatory 
power, a combination of the model and the market odds improves upon both.
9  This finding is 
consistent with the results obtained from the non-sports forecasting literature which indicates that 
combining forecasts usually improves accuracy.   
 3.Experts 
  Figlewski (1979) examined the forecasting record of a number of individuals who 
handicapped horse races. While the handicappers were successful 28.7% of the time in selecting 
the horse that would win the race, the favorite, as measured by the betting odds, won 29.4% of 
the time.  Both the track-odds and the handicappers improved over the null that all horses had an 
equal probability of winning, but combining the handicappers’ selections with the market odds 
did not significantly improve forecasting accuracy.
10  In Britain, the odds in the handicapper’s 
morning line were also less accurate in predicting the probability of winning than were the final 
market odds.(Crafts, 1985).   
  The experts also displayed the favorite-longshot bias.  Snyder (1978) found that the 
favorite-long shot bias of official race track handicappers and newspaper forecasters was greater 
than that of the general public. Lo (1994) showed that the favorite-longshot bias associated with 
 
9However, in a real time situation an individual might not have the time and thus be in a 
position to use the final odds in combination with the model before placing a bet.  
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the handicappers’ morning line odds was even larger than that of the final odds of the betting 
market. 
 4.Summary 
a. The market odds and the frequency of wins are calibrated except for the favorite-
longshot bias.  However, this bias is not observed universally. 
b. Models can explain some of the variance of horse races. Combining models with 
market odds improves accuracy.  
c. The odds provided by experts are better than those obtained by chance but not as 
accurate as the betting market odds. 
  d. Experts displayed even more favorite-longshot bias than the final market odds. 
  
 B.  Baseball 
  There is so much information about baseball, that it is surprising how few forecasts are 
available for analysis.  There are a number of models that have estimated the importance of the 
offensive and defensive factors that determine the outcome of a game, but forecasts from these 
models have not been published in the open literature.11
  1. The betting market 
  Bets in this market are made on the outcome of a game. Consequently, like the horse race 
betting market, the analysis is based on odds which can then be converted into probabilities, but 
the odds are not quoted directly.  The bookmaker quotes, a line, +140, -150 for example.  This 
 
10Bird and McCrae (1987) found that the odds of Australian bookmakers, who could be 
considered experts, were fully incorporated into the racetrack odds.  
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means that the winner of a $100 bet on the underdog team would win $140, while someone 
betting on the favored team would bet $150 to win $1.  The difference is the commission.  From 
these odds it is possible to calculate the betting market’s subjective probability that the underdog 
will win. The probability is calculated at the midpoint of the line, i.e. 1/(1.45 +1) = 0.41 .  This 
subjective probability can then be compared with the percentage of times that the underdog won 
when those odds were quoted.  If the subjective probabilities are calibrated with the observed 
probabilities, the forecasts would be considered rational. 
  Three studies examine the relationship between these subjective and observed 
probabilities.  Woodland and Woodland (1994, p.275; 1999, p.339) and Gandar et al. (2002, 
p.1313) all indicate that the odds are related to the observed outcomes, but the relationship is not 
strictly monotonic.12  In order to test whether the forecasts were rational, Woodland and 
Woodland (1994)  regressed the objective probabilities on the subjective odds.  They obtained 
mixed results that were dependent on the method of estimation.  They argued that betting in 
baseball yielded a reverse favorite-underdog bias, with underdogs underbet.  Gandar et al. made 
a minor correction to the Woodland-Woodland methodology and found that rationality was not 
rejected, and if there were any bias, it was very slight. 
  2. Modeling  
  Many of the basic models of a baseball game consider either the characteristics of the 
offense to determine the number of runs scored or the qualities of the pitching staff in permitting 
runs to be scored.  Thus Porter and Scully (1982) estimate a production function based on a 
 
11Individuals may have used these models in deciding whether to place bets about the outcome of 
games, but these data are not readily available.  
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team’s slugging average and its strike out to walk pitching ratio.
13  Other models provided more 
detail about baseball’s offense and pitching; for example  Bennett and Flueck (1983) examined 
various characteristics of offense
14 to determine the number of runs that would be scored but did 
not make explicit predictions with their model.  The model was estimated using data from the 
1969-1976 seasons. It was then  reestimated by sequentially eliminating one year’s data from the 
sample using the data of the remaining seven years.  While the adjusted correlation coefficients 
of those eight regressions did not differ significantly, the coefficients of some of the variables did 
display considerable variation.  
  Rosner et al. (1996) estimated relationships that measured pitcher performance and 
determined the number of runs that would be scored in each inning.  They were able to do this 
because play-by-play data have been available for all Major League Baseball games since 1984.  
An adjusted negative binomial distribution was fit to the data to explain the number of batters 
that a particular pitcher would face.  The number of runs that will be scored is a complex  
function of two distributions: this negative binomial distribution and a conditional distribution of 
the number of runs that score given that the pitcher has faced a specified number of batters. 
(Rosner et al. 1996, p.352.)  Other studies include Malios (2000) who listed the factors that 
determined offensive and pitching performance, and Turocy (2005) who added a speed variable 
to the conventional production function.  None of these models produced forecasts that could be 
 
12The QPS statistic also known as the Brier score could have been calculated and decomposed to 
determine the degree of calibration. 
13This model was not used as a predictor  but rather was employed to measure the relative 
performance of baseball managers.  Horowitz (1994) uses a power score variant of this 
production function (runs scored/ runs allowed) in a similar analysis of managerial performance.  
See Ruggiero et al. (1997) and Horowitz (1997) for a further discussion of this subject. 
14These variables included the various types of hits, walks, types of outs, etc.  
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evaluated. 
  On the other hand,  Bukiet et al. (1997) modeled each at-bat as a 25x25 transition matrix 
that explained all of the alternatives that might occur.  Markov chains were then used to predict 
team performance based on the characteristics of each batter. This model was used to predict the 
actual number of games that all of the teams in the National League would win in 1989.  While 
the model failed to predict one of the two divisional winners and the number of runs that were 
scored was underestimated, the Spearman Rank Correlation between the predicted and actual 
number of games that each team won was .77.  (Authors’ calculations). 
  There are two other models that were used to predict National League divisional winners. 
Barry and Hartigan (1993) used a binary choice model to calculate the probability that in 1991 a 
National League team would win its division.  The model was based on the strength of the teams 
as the season progressed with greater weight placed on the most recent sequence of games as 
well as the teams’ home field advantage.  Using simulations, the model successfully showed that 
Atlanta’s probability of winning its division was increasing as the season progressed.  Finally, 
Smyth and Smyth (1994) based their predictions of division winners and relative standings on 
the payrolls of each of the teams in each division and league.  They found that the rankings 
within a division were correlated with the teams’ payrolls.
15
  3. Experts and Experts vs. Models 
  Despite all the predictions that are made every year by experts about the relative expected 
performance of the Major League teams, we found only one study that examined the quality of 
 
15Szymanski (2003, p. 1154) presented similar results for soccer. He showed that, within 
each league, the winning performance of a team was associated with the relative size of the 
teams’ payrolls.  Forrest et al. (2005a) use payrolls as a measure of team quality.  
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those forecasts.  Smyth and Smyth (1994) found that the experts’ forecasts were better than 
random guesses.  However, the predictions of those experts were not significantly different from 
those based on the rankings of teams’ payrolls. 
 4. Summary 
a. The market odds are calibrated with the observed ratios of outcomes, but there is some 
debate about the possibility of a reverse favorite-longshot bias. 
b. Many models that explain various aspects of a baseball game have been estimated, but 
they have not been used to make forecasts. 
c. There is one study that examined the forecasts of experts. The experts’ predictions 
were better than random, but not different from models that used payrolls as the 
predictor. 
  
 C.  Football 
  The forecasts about the outcomes of professional and college football games, like those 
from other sports, come from the betting market, statistical systems, and experts.   Unlike horse 
racing and baseball where odds are used in establishing the payoff to a bet that involves selecting 
a winning horse or team, football bets do not involve selecting the winning team.  Rather the bet 
is whether or not the favored team beats the underdog by a margin (number of points) specified 
in the bet.  This margin is called the point spread.  If an individual bets that the favored team will 
beat the underdog by more than this spread, the bettor only wins if the favorite is victorious by 
more than this number of points.  Someone betting on the underdog can win if there is an upset 
and the favored team loses or if the favorite wins by less than the specified number of points.  
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Every bettor pays $11 for a $10 payoff.  The difference is the bookmaker’s commission also 
known as the vigorish. Given this commission, a bettor must be right at least 52.4% of the time, 
just to break even. (Sauer, 1988, p. 211 )  
  While the betting market is not concerned with selecting the winning team, it is possible 
to use the data about the spread to determine whether the market accurately predicts who will 
win.  Thus, our analysis of the betting market examines two questions: (1) How frequently does 
the team that is favored to win actually win? and (2) Are there any observed biases in the spreads 
that were published just before the game was played? 
 1.Betting  Market 
  a.  Winners 
  The focus of the previous analyses have been whether the betting market involving NFL 
games was economically efficient. With a few exceptions, the studies have not considered the 
forecasting accuracy of the market in predicting the winners of games.  Stern (1991) 
demonstrated the difference between the winning margin and the point spread was normally 
distributed with mean zero and a standard deviation equal to 14. He then used the observed 
spreads in simulations to determine how the teams would have done in the 1984 season.  The 
results were mixed. While 5 of the 6 division winners were identified, only 1 of the 4 additional 
playoff teams was selected by the model.   
  Boulier and Stekler ( 2003) and Song et al. (2007) showed, that in every year from 1994-
2001,  the betting market correctly predicted the winner of NFL games at least 63% of the time.  
The average over this time period was about 65%.  In fact, in selecting the winners of games, the 
betting market was the most accurate forecasting method in every year.  We tabulated the  
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relationship between the point spread and the ex post winning percentage of the home team. 
Table 1 indicates that the ex post winning percentage is positively related to the ex ante spread, 
but the increase is not monotonic. 
 
  b.  Point  spread 
  In analyzing the market’s performance relative to the spread, the main question is: Are 
there any observed biases?  The overwhelming majority of the evidence indicates that the betting 
market is efficient in the sense that, on average, there is no profitable betting strategy against the 
spread.  The traditional method for determining whether a forecast is unbiased is to run the 
regression:   
                  A = a + bF + e,           (1) 
where A is the actual value and F is the forecast.  If the joint null hypothesis that a = 0 and b =1 
is rejected, the forecasts are biased.   In the football betting market, the equivalent equation is:     
        DP = a +bPS + e,                  (2) 
where DP is the difference in the game score ( actual points) and PS is the betting market point 
spread.
16  If the forecast is unbiased, on average, the difference in the point scores will not differ 
significantly from the point spreads.   Most studies do not reject the null hypothesis that a = 0 
and b =1, but the explanatory power of the equation is usually low indicating that there is 
considerable unexplained variation.   
  On the other hand, Gray and Gray (1997) use a different method to test the hypothesis 
that the forecasts are efficient.  They estimate a probit where the dependent variable is whether  
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the team beat the spread or not.
17  They find that two variables, whether a team plays at home 
and whether it is a favorite, are jointly significant. If the market had provided an efficient 
forecast, neither variable should have had any explanatory power.
18
  Since there is a considerable amount of unexplained variability, forecasting biases and 
profitable betting strategies may exist.  We are concerned only with the forecast biases.  Vergin 
(2001) argued that bettors ( forecasters) were subject to an overreaction bias, i.e. they overreact 
to the most recent positive information and undervalue other data.   “For example, if a team won 
a game by a very large margin in a given week, the betting public would tend to overrate the 
team in the following week.” (Vergin, 2001, p. 499).
19   Vergin examined a number of ways that 
bettors ( forecasters) could have reacted to recent information.  He found that, in most cases, 
over 15 seasons, the bettors had displayed a bias in interpreting recent positive data.  Gray and 
Gray (1997) also found that the market overreacted to the most recent information.
20
  The forecasting literature has also analyzed the way that individuals interpret 
information.  Kahnemann and Tversky (1982) had argued that individuals place too much 
emphasis on new information, but some experimental data suggested the opposite: people anchor 
on a past observations and place too little emphasis on new information. (Andreassen, 1987, 
1990)  The data from the football betting market seem to favor the former view. 
 
16Both the scores and the point spreads are usually constructed on a home team minus 
away team basis. 
17 A probit places less weight on outliers than OLS does. 
18There is, however, a controversy about the appropriate way to jointly test for home 
team bias and underdog bias. (Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Dare and MacDonald, 1996; Dare and 
Holland, 2004). 
19Vergin and Scriabin (1978) were also concerned with this issue.  
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 2.Models 
  The many statistical systems that are designed to predict the margin of victory of NFL or 
college football games are estimated in different ways.
21  Zuber et al., (1985) and Sauer et al., 
(1988) derived  models using the fundamental characteristics of a team’s offense and defense to 
explain the margin of victory.  Those models correctly predicted a margin of victory that would 
have been profitable 59% of the time for games played in 1983, but the success rate was only 
39% in 1984.
22  Dana and Knetter (1994) developed a dynamic model using  point score indices 
as a measure of the abilities of the teams but the accuracy ratio of the model was generally less 
than 50%.   
  Other models are based on power scores that summarize the latent abilities of the football 
teams.  Variants of these power scores have been used in forecasting both the outcomes of 
football games and the margins of victory.  Harville (1980) found that in the 1971-77 seasons the 
betting market, with a 72% success rate in selecting the winner, was more accurate than his 
statistical procedure, which was right 70% of the time.
23    Boulier and Stekler (2003) used the 
power scores published in the New York Times and analyzed the forecast: the team with the 
 
20In addition, Gray and Gray observed that the market had a slight overconfidence in the 
favorite’s ability to cover the spread. In the 1976-94 seasons, that team won by slightly less than 
the market had expected. 
21Song et al. (2007) used information from 32 systems that provided information on the 
Internet. 
22The papers did not indicate the number of times that the model predicted the winners of 
each game, but the models explained 73-81% of the variance of the score differentials for the 
two NFL seasons. 
 
23These success rates are higher than the accuracy that has been observed in more recent 
seasons.  One explanation is that more ties occurred in the earlier seasons and Harville counted a 
tie as ½ of a successful forecast.  Harville did not report the methods’ record in betting against 
the spread.  
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higher power score would win.  These forecasts had an accuracy ratio of 61%, less than that of 
the betting market which achieved 66% accuracy and only comparable to a naive forecast that 
the home team will win.  
  An intensive evaluation  of the forecasting record of statistical systems indicated that they 
had a 62% average accuracy ratio in picking the winners of the games played in the 2000 and 
2001 NFL seasons. ( Song et al., 2007). This ratio was comparable to the record of experts but 
less than the 66% accuracy of the betting market.  Every system had a success rate of at least 
50% and the ratios for all but one system were significantly different from those that could have 
occurred by chance.
24  In forecasting against the betting spread,  most systems, however, were 
not even as accurate as the naive forecast of flipping a coin.    
 3.  Experts 
  We found information about two types of experts: bookmakers
25 and sports 
commentators (analysts).  In NFL games the bookmakers .........AVERY AND CHEVALIER.   
In the college football betting market, the bookmakers set an opening line that was biased against 
the favorite team, but the closing spread was less biased. (Dare et al., 2005). 
  Song et al. (2007) undertook a comprehensive analysis of the other group of experts and 
examined the ability of sports commentators to predict either the outcome of NFL football games 
or the margin by which a team was expected to win. That study used the forecasts of 48 experts 
who predicted which team would win and an overlapping ( but not identical) set of 52 forecasters 
who made selections against the betting line.  All told, the forecasts of 70 experts were analyzed.   
 
 
24 The test was based on the binomial distribution and a 5% level of significance.  
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Based on this sample of nearly 18,000 forecasts for the 2000 and 2001 seasons, Song et al. 
concluded that experts predicted the game winner approximately 62% of the time; this was the 
same accuracy ratio as the statistical systems achieved, but was less than the betting market’s 
66%.  Similarly, the accuracy ratios of both the experts and systems in forecasting against the 
betting line was 50%.  On average the experts did worse than using the naive model of flipping a 
coin. 
  Less comprehensive studies yield similar findings.  Boulier and Stekler (2003) report 
that the sports editor of the New York Times selected the winner of the games during the 1994-
2000 seasons 60% of the time.  Even earlier, Pankoff (1968) showed that experts’ accuracy in 
forecasting whether a team would beat the spread ranged from 48% to 56%. 
 4.  Summary 
a. The market correctly picks the winner of a game about 2/3 of the time. This record is 
better than that of the experts and systems. 
b. The null that the point spread is an unbiased predictor of the margin of victory is 
generally not rejected.   
c. Models are successful in predicting winners but they are not as accurate as the betting 
market. 
d. Models and experts are equally good both in forecasting winners and in predicting 
against the spread. The predictions against the spread are not significantly better than 
chance. 
 D.  Basketball 
 
25For information about the process of setting the opening line ( spread ) on football  
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  1. Betting Market 
  The studies that have analyzed the basketball betting market have not found any 
significant biases.  There is a slight but insignificant underestimate of the home court advantage, 
(Brown and Sauer 1993a) and large favorites may be over bet. (Paul and Weinbach, 2005a, 
2005b).   
  The major forecasting issues of interest in the basketball betting market are (1) the 
absence or presence of the “hot hand” phenomenon and (2) the use of information in this market.  
The “hot hand” is a belief that a team that wins a game is more likely to win the next game and 
indicates that forecasters believe that these events are not independent but rather are positively 
autocorrelated.  Camerer (1989) argues that the hot hand is a myth and that bettors have a 
misunderstanding of random processes, especially with small samples.  Brown and Sauer 
(1993b) build a model based on teams’ abilities and streak dummies in order to test this 
hypothesis.  They conclude that the hot hand belief is embodied in the point spread and is, 
therefore, an important effect.
26  However, they were not able to determine whether, in fact, a hot 
hand phenomenon existed or whether it was a myth and bettors were misperceiving the real 
process and thus displaying a cognitive bias. 
  Using changes in the betting line, it is possible to infer the role that information and 
informed bettors play in the betting market.  Brown and Sauer (1993) and Gandar et al (1998, 
2000) examine these questions from different perspectives.   Brown and Sauer first estimate a 
model based on a proxy for fundamentals: the points scored by the two teams that play against 
each other.  This model explains 89% of the variation in the point spread and also predicts well 
 
games, see Schoenfeld, (2003).  
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out of sample. Brown and Sauer thus conclude that the betting market adjusts for fundamental 
changes in the relative team abilities that may have occurred from one season to another. 
  Gandar et al. examine the differences between the opening and closing point lines for 
NBA games.
27  They show that frequently there are large changes between the opening and 
closing quotations.  These changes reflect betting sentiment that is different from that of the 
bookmaker.  They test a number of hypotheses, show that the opening line is not as accurate as 
the closing line in forecasting the margin of victory, and conclude that informed bettors have 
eliminated some of the bias in the opening line.      
 2.  Models 
  Zak et al. (1979) developed a production function that represented the defensive and 
offensive elements of a basketball game.  The model was designed to measure the relative 
contribution of each of those elements to the winning margin.  Each team’s productive efficiency 
was then calculated.  The rank of each team in terms its productive efficiency was identical to the 
rank based on winning percentage in the 1976 NBA season.  This method has not been 
subsequently used for making forecasts. 
  Berri (1999) used a similar model that was designed to measure the contribution of 
individual players to a team’s wins.  Rather than directly predicting a team’s wins, each player’s 
contribution towards his team’s wins were summed.  The ranking obtained by summing the 
 
26Also see Paul and Weinbach (2005b). 
27Gandar et al. (1998) examine the winning margin ( the difference in the scores of the 
two teams) while Gandar et al. (2000) analyze the totals betting market (the sum of the scores of 
the teams). 
  The opening line is set early in the day that the game is played and the closing line is 
established just before the game begins.  Thus it is not likely that much new information about 
the teams will have become available during the course of the day.   
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contributions of each player to team victories was remarkably close to the ranking based on the 
teams’ actual won-lost records in the 1997- 1998 season.  The Spearman Rank Correlation was 
.986   (Authors’ calculations). 
  Other modeling approaches did not construct production functions but rather used proxy 
variables that measured the latent skills or strengths of each team.  The margin of victory in a 
contest between two teams was considered a measure of the comparative strengths of the two.     
(Brown and Sauer, 1993; Harville and Smith, 1994; Oorlog, 1995; Kaplan and Garstka, 2001; 
Harville, 2003).  On the other hand, if two teams that had not played each other previously were 
to meet, it would be impossible to measure the comparative strengths of those opponents.  This is 
a particular problem in trying to forecast the outcomes of  college basketball (and football) 
games, because no team plays every other team.   
  Statistical scoring systems have been developed to overcome this problem.  As an 
example, Sagarin has developed a system that can be used to predict the expected scoring by any 
two teams.  This system is based on the number of victories of each team, the strength of the 
teams that were defeated, the margin of victory adjusted for blowouts, and an adjustment for the 
home court advantage.
28    
  Alternatively, in a tournament, the seedings, which are obtained from a statistical scoring 
system, of the teams can be used as a predictor.   Since 1985, the NCAA has selected 64 college 
basketball teams to participate in a tournament to select a national championship.  The 64 teams 
 
28The difference between two teams’ Sagarin ratings is a good predictor of the margin of 
victory. (Carlin, 1996).  
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are divided into four regional tournaments of 16 teams that are ranked from 1 through 16.
29  
Boulier and Stekler (1999), Caudill and Godwin (2002), Kaplan and Garstka (2001), and 
Harville (2003) all found that the difference in ranks predicted the winner around 70% of the 
time. However, their statistical models differed.    
  Boulier and Stekler (1999) used  a probit based solely on the difference in ranks. Caudill 
and Godwin (2002) developed a heterogeneous skewness model that takes into account not only 
the difference in ranks but also the level of the seed. Thus the probability that a Number 1 seed 
beats a Number 5 seed is greater than the probability that a Number 5 seed beats a Number 9 
ranked team.  Finally, Harville (2003) constructed a modified least squares ranking procedure 
based by placing a limit on the margin of victory and then compared the forecasts of the model 
solely with the difference in ranks.  (Also see Schwertman et al., 1991, 1996; Carlin, 1996).   
  The accuracy of forecasts based on ranks has been compared with that of other methods. 
Kaplan and Garstka (2001) found that forecasts based on picking the higher seeds was slightly 
more accurate than using the betting market and that forecasts based on the Sagarin system were 
superior to both.  Harville (2003) then compared the forecasting accuracy of his statistical 
method with (1) forecasting that the higher seed will win and (2) the betting market.  The 
statistical procedures were the most accurate in forecasting the winners of the 2000 NCAA 
tournament, but there was little difference between forecasts based on ranks and the betting 
market.  Kaplan and Garstka and Harville have been the only authors who have found that 
forecasts obtained from the market were not more accurate than those obtained from either 
 
29 The seeds are determined from a statistical scoring system, the RPI, called the ratings 
percentage index.  It gives weights of .25, .50, and .25 to the team’s winning percentage, the  
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experts or statistical systems.
30
 3.  Experts 
  While there are no studies that have directly examined the forecasts of experts in 
predicting the outcomes of basketball games, there is one piece of indirect evidence.  The 
bookmakers who set the opening line or point spread can be considered experts.  The evidence is 
that the opening line that is established by the bookmakers is somewhat less accurate than the 
closing line established by the betting market.
31 ( Gandar, et al., 1998).  This indicates that 
experts are not as accurate as the market in forecasting the winning margins.  However, this 
result does not imply that the experts exhibit a bias, because the changes between the opening 
and closing lines seem to be normally distributed around zero ( no change). (Gandar et al., 1998, 
Table IV, p. 395). 
 4.  Summary 
a. The basketball betting market does not have any observed biases; the market moves to 
eliminate the early biases of the bookmakers. 
b. Many models of basketball games have been estimated, but except for games played in 
the NCAA tournaments there have been few forecasts. 
c. The only evidence that we have about experts is that the bookmakers’ opening line is 
less accurate than the final spread. 
 
 
winning percentage of its opponents, and winning percentage of the opponents’ opponents, 
respectively. 
30 Harville also found that there was no significant difference between the market and 
statistical systems in the football bowl games played after the 2001 regular season.  
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 E.  Soccer 
  Gambling in soccer is based on odds, but this betting market is different from those that 
have been analyzed above. The bookmakers set the odds at the beginning of a week and do not 
change them during the betting period. While some studies have tested for bias and 
inefficiencies, the focus of the literature relating to this sport has been on statistical procedures 
and the performance of these models relative to the bookmakers’ odds. 
  1. Betting Market and Bookmakers  
  In one of the few studies that searched for biases, Cain et al. (2000) showed that there 
was a  favorite- longshot bias, similar to that found in horse racing, in the soccer betting market.  
Many studies have found that models contained information that was not embodied in the odds. 
(Pope and Peel, 1989; Kuypers, 2000; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004; Dixon and Pope 
(2004)  These findings suggests that the bookmakers’ odds were inefficient. 
 2.  Models 
  The modeling has been done at three levels.  In the production function approach 
variables that are associated with attack and defense are embodied in the model. A second 
approach is to model each team’s goal scoring abilities and then predict which team will win 
based on the difference in the predicted number of goals.  Finally, discrete choice models based 
on past performance are used to directly predict the probabilities of the home team winning, 
drawing or losing. 
  In the production function approach, Carmichael et al. (2004) estimated the effects of 
specific types of plays on the difference in the number of goals scored by the two teams.  Their 
 
31 While the results are significantly different, the differences are too small to be  
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equation was able to capture the relative performance of teams in the English Premier league,  
but they did not make any forecasts beyond the period of fit. 
  The Poisson distribution is an alternative model for predicting the number of goals that 
teams will score.  Dixon and Coles (1997) show that this distribution provides a good fit to the 
score data for the 1992-95 seasons, but they add attack and defense parameters to the basic 
model of Maher (1982)..  Moreover, they  permit the parameters to vary to reflect changes in 
team strength that may have occurred over time.  The probabilities obtained from the Dixon-
Coles model are similar to those of the bookmakers  (as derived from the odds).
32  ( Dixon and 
Pope, 2004).  The model of Cain et al. differed from that of Dixon-Coles for two reasons. It used 
the negative binomial distribution
33 to  model the number of goals scored, and the independent 
variables were the win-lose odds prices quoted by the bookmakers rather than proxy attack-
defense variables.  The Cain et al. model predicted the total number of goals each team scored 
and yielded probability forecasts that approximated the observed distribution of particular scores. 
  Since the abilities and performance of teams can change over time, some models have 
become dynamic to capture these effects.  Dixon and Coles were among the first to incorporate 
dynamic factors into their model.  Crowder et al. (2002) derive an approximation to the Dixon-
Coles model, show that the two models yield similar results, but the success ratio associated with 
the prediction, home team will win, is only around 50%. 
  The Bayesian dynamic model of Rue and Salveson (2000) yielded model likelihood 
 
economically meaningful. 
32Dixon and Coles do not provide a detailed evaluation  Nor do they compare their 
predictions with a naive forecast that the home team wins 46%, draws 27%, and loses 27% of the 
time. 
33The Poisson distribution is a limiting case of the negative binomial.  
measures that were very similar to the bookmakers’ odds.  Moreover, they used a Markov chain 
Monte Carlo retrospective analysis to predict the posterior final rankings of the teams in the 
English Premier League.  The relationship between the actual and predicted rankings in the 
1997-1998 season was not perfect.  The model forecast that Manchester United had a 43% 
chance of being the highest ranked team; it finished second to Arsenal that had been given a 25% 
chance.  Nevertheless, the model correctly selected the top four teams in the League. 
  The discrete choice models were based on ordered probits that included a variety of 
explanatory variables.  Kuypers (2000) included the bookmakers’ odds as well as some 
performance variables in his model.   The win ratios of the two teams playing the match were 
included as independent variables in the model of Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004).  Neither 
study compared the models’ predicted probabilities with the outcomes, but both indicated that 
there was little difference between the models’ and bookmakers’ probabilities. 
 3.  Experts 
  We have data that evaluates the forecasts of two types of experts.  The first is the group 
of tipsters who write for newspapers;
34  the second consists of the bookmakers who provide the 
fixed odds.  The evidence is that the tipsters’ forecasts have little value and that they do not 
process public information properly. (Pope and Peel, 1989; Forest and Simmons, 2000). 
  On the other hand, Forrest et al. (2005) demonstrate that there is virtually no difference 
between the accuracy of the forecasts of the odds-makers and those obtained from a complex 
statistical model.  This result is consistent with previous results because Kuypers (2000, Table 2, 
                                                 
34Andersson et al. (2005) evaluated the predictions of the outcome of the 2002 World 
Cup matches made by individuals who had  familiarity with soccer.  The participants were called  
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p.1359) had shown that the bookmakers’ odds, when converted into probabilities are closely 
related to the objective ratios of the outcome of the events. (Also see Goddard and 
Asimakopoulos, 2004). 
 4.  Summary 
  a. There is no serious bias in the fixed-odds soccer betting market, but there are some 
inefficiencies. 
  b. Many types of models involving soccer have been estimated and have generated 
predictions that are comparable to those of the bookmakers. 
  c.  The tipster forecasters were not very valuable, but there was no difference between the 
forecasts of bookmakers and those of a sophisticated statistical model. 
  
 IV.  Results 
  A. Cross-Sport results 
  So far we have considered the forecasting procedures and results only on a sport by sport 
basis.  The results relating to the various sports are so similar  that the conclusions have to be 
considered robust.   
  1. In every sport, except for horse racing, the market forecast is unbiased.  The bias in 
horse racing occurs at the two extremes: favorites are underbet and long-shots are overbet, but 
these results do not hold in all countries. 
                                                                                                                                                             
experts but in reality they were not “real” experts. In any event, their predictions were no better 
than those that could have occurred by chance. 
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  2. In markets where odds are quoted, the ex ante betting probabilities and the ex post 
outcome ratios are calibrated.   
  3.The betting spread is an unbiased predictor of the winning margins in American 
football and basketball.  Moreover, the betting market correctly predicted the winner of NFL 
games about 2/3 of the time. 
  4. Models that explain the outcomes of games or matches have been estimated for all 
sports.  Sometimes the models were derived from the fundamental characteristics of the sport. In 
other instances, variables that were proxies for these fundamental characteristics were used as 
explanatory variables or discrete choice models were used.  
  5. The forecasts of many models were not available.   However, systems correctly 
predicted the winners of NFL games more than 60% of the time. This was comparable to the 
accuracy of experts but less than that of the market. The soccer models were comparable in 
accuracy to bookmaker odds. 
  6. In analyzing the forecasts of experts, it is important to realize that there are many types 
of experts and that the extent of knowledge differs among the various groups. Experts who have 
a financial stake in the forecast are likely to be more knowledgeable. 
  7. There is no evidence that either statistical systems or experts consistently outperform 
the  betting  market.         
  B. APPLICABILITY OF THESE RESULTS TO FORECASTING IN GENERAL 
  The analysis of the sports forecasts also provided insights about the forecasting process.  
Some of these results are in accord with the generally accepted views of the forecasting 
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profession; others are in conflict with those beliefs or require further research.  The findings that 
agree with our a priori views: 
  1. Forecasters correctly used information to reduce the biases that they observed. In horse 
racing, more information reduced the favorite- longshot bias; the final odds in horse racing were 
less biased than those of the racetrack’s handicapper; in basketball the closing spread was closer 
to the margin of victory than was the opening quote. AVERY AND CHEVALIER 
  2. Forecasters are overconfident in their ability to predict. 
  3. Many forecasters have a misunderstanding of random processes as evidenced by their 
belief in the hot hand. 
  4. Combining forecasts does improve accuracy. 
  C. CONFLICTING RESULTS 
  However, our analysis of these sports forecasts seriously conflicts with the widely held 
belief that the predictions derived from statistical methods are more accurate than those of 
experts.  The analysis of 31000 NFL forecasts by Song et al. showed that the accuracy of the two 
methods of forecasting was virtually identical.  The accuracy of the statistical methods was, 
however, less variable.  Similarly in soccer, there was no difference between the accuracy of the 
models’ and bookmakers’ forecasts. 
  An area that requires further research concerns the relative weight that forecasters place 
on new and old information.  There is a gambler’s fallacy that the next outcome, even though it 
is independent of previous events, depends on events that have previously occurred.  This fallacy 
has been observed in horse racing studies.  This is akin to placing too much weight on new 
information. (Vaughan Williams, 1999, pp. 15-16).  The majority of the evidence indicates that 
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forecasters overreact to new information rather than anchor on the old forecast and adjust it in 
the face of the new data.  On the other hand, Sauer (1998, p. 2059)  reports on situations where 
recent information is given too little weight relative to what is optimal. 
  D. MOST IMPORTANT RESULT 
  There is no evidence that either statistical systems or experts consistently outperform the 
market.  This not only agrees with the findings about economic efficiency but also with the 
evidence that prediction models, in general, are the most accurate predictors in other fields.  The 
market price is the best predictor of the event because the market aggregates all the information 
that is relevant to the event. ( Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). 
. 
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